ASA-SIS
Session Slot: 2:00- 3:50 Monday
Estimated Audience Size: 100
AudioVisual Request: xxx
Session Title: Rounding the Bases: Modeling Behavior in the Business of
Baseball
Theme Session: No
Applied Session: Yes
Session Organizer: Albert, Jim Bowling Green State University
Address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH 43403
Phone: 419-372-7456
Fax: 419-372-6092
Email: albert@math.bgsu.edu
Session Timing: 110 minutes total (Sorry about format):
Opening Remarks by Chair - 0 minutes First Speaker - 30 minutes Second Speaker - 30 minutes Third Speaker - 30 minutes Discussant - 10 minutes Floor Discussion - 10 minutes
Session Chair: Albert, Jim Bowling Green State University
Address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics Bowling Green State University Bowling Green, OH 43403
Phone: 419-372-7456
Fax: 419-372-6092
Email: albert@math.bgsu.edu
1. Can You Tell the Players Without a Scorecard? Errors in Variables in Baseball Discrimination
Wobbekind, Richard L., University of Colorado
Address: Campus Box 419 College of Business University of Colorado Boulder, CO 80309
Phone: 303-492-1147
Fax: 303-492-5962
Email: wobbekin@colorado.edu
Frederick, David M., University of Colorado
Kaempfer, William H., University of Colorado
Abstract: Jackie Robinson's signing by the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 ushered a new era for Major League Baseball, signaling the sport's color barrier had been broken. In the subsequent fifty years, baseball has seemed to some a triumph of equal opportunity, where participants are evaluated solely on their merits. To others, questions linger, such as: why do the racial composition of teams and management differ, and does racial discrimination exist in salary or career longevity? Thus it is not surprising that research on discrimination in baseball has expanded. What is unexpected is that in these studies, little attempt was made to consider the intricacies of the concept, race. For example, most of these studies regress the dependent variable (e.g., salary) on a list of productivity indicators and a dummy variable for race. This dichotomization creates difficulties in estimating the extent of discrimination in baseball. The current project has three goals. The first is to develop a more formal approach for recognizing race and ethnic differences among players that will be helpful to the study of discrimination in baseball. The significant error that could result from dichotomizing a race variable suggests the need for more formality and understanding. The second goal is to use the approach to examine a collective bargaining institution, the baseball salary arbitration mechanism, for any evidence it may yield on discrimination. Last, the approach will be used to revisit studies of discrimination in baseball that use statistical evidence.
2. Streak Management
Fort, Rodney, Washington State University
Address: Department of Economics Washington State University Pullman, WA 99164-4741
Phone: 509-335-1538
Fax: 509-335-4362
Email: fort@mail.wsu.edu
Abstract: The paper is about winning streaks in baseball. It analyzes game streaks, within a season, over a couple of seasons. We look for non-random streaks and find very little evidence of any. However, in the frequency domain, an interesting test shows that it certainly does "pay" if one can manage for streaks! Further, fans love them, as evidenced by a model of attendance at major league baseball games
3. Managerial Succession and Labor Market Response
Butler, Stephen A., The University of Oklahoma
Address: College of Business Administration The University of Oklahoma 307 West Brooks, Room 200 Norman, OK 73019-0450
Phone: 405-325-5759
Fax:
Email: sbutler@ou.edu
Abstract: Managers in every organization contract to provide a certain amount of productive effort to the organization. It is often assumed that without some monitor of effort, the manager will shirk and become ineffective. Fama (1980) proposed that both the internal and external labor market for managers' effort would discipline the mangers so that they provide the contracted amount of productive effort. Managerial succession within an organization has concentrated on the effect of that organization. The contention is that a more effective manager is brought in as a replacement. However, little is known about the managerial labor market's response to the change. Is the market able to recognize and appropriately judge the former manger's effectiveness? This study indicates that in a relatively noiseless market the response is appropriate. There are also reputation effects rewarded by the labor market.
Discussant: Berry, Scott Texas A&M
Address: Statistics Department Texas A&M University College Station TX 77843-3143.
Phone: 409-845-5650
Fax: 409-845-3144
Email: berry@stat.tamu.edu
List of speakers who are nonmembers: Wobbekind, Frederick, Kaempfer, Fort, Butler